Signature vcrification
Introduction: Difie and Hellman [l] proposed in 1976 the wellknown public-key distribution scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem to enable two parties to establish a common sccrct session key based on their exchanged public keys; however, their original scheme still requires an authentication channel to exchangc the public keys. Since then, several key exchange protocols [2, 31, which use digital signatures of the exchanged public keys to provide authentication, have been proposed. In these protocols, the Diffie-Hellman public keys are treated as messages and one-way hash values of these public keys are computed. Digital signatures need to be generated based on these one-way hash values; otherwise forgery can be easily achieved.
However, there exists a major difference of security assumptions between digital signature schemes and conventional one-way hash functions. The security assumption of most signature schemes are based on some well-known computational problems, such as the discrete logarithm problem [4] and the factoring problem. The complexities of these problems have been well studied and the difficulties of solving them are recognised. In contrast, the security of a one-way hash function is based on the complexity of analysing a simplc iterated function. A one-way hash function may seem very difficult to analyse at the beginning, hut it may turn out to be vulnerable to some special attacks later, e.g. recent advancement in cryptanalytic research has found that MD5 is at the edge of iisking successful cryptanalytic attack [SI. Instead of overall security relying on the weaker assumption of the signature scheme and the one-way hash function, it would be more secure to have a key distribution without using one-way hash functions.
The MQV key agreement protocol proposed by Menezes er U / . [6] in 1995 is probably the first key agreement protocol that utilised a signature for the Diffie-Hellman public key without using a one-way hash function. The MQV key agreement protocol has been adopted to become a standard in the IEEE P1363 committee [7] . In 1998, we published a key agreement protocol 181 that generalised the MQV protocol in three respects. First, signature variants for Diffie-Hehnan public keys developed in 1997 [Y] are employed in the protocol. Secondly, we allowed two communication entities to establish multiple secret keys in one round of interaction. Thirdly, we simplified the key computations.
Two attacks [lo, 111 on this key agreement protocol were found recently. In this Letter, we attempt to show that these two attacks can casily be avoided by modifying the signature signing equation. We point out here that this modification does not increase computations. The main body of t h~s Letter is almost the same as [8] except that we have modified the signature signing and verification equations.
Digital signature sclzenies .for D@-Hellman public keys: The Diffie-Hellman public key is r = ak mod p, where k is a secret random integer within [ I , p -21 privately selected by the signer, p is a large prime and a is a primitive number in G%). We can call these random parameters, k and r, short-term private key and short-term public key, respectively. To sign this Diffie-Hellman public key i', the signer needs to use the long-teiiii private key x and the long-term public key y = ax mod p .
We list four signature variants for signing Diffie-Hellman public keys from [9] . These variants are the most efficient variants since each permutes four parameters { r , s, k, .x} directly. The signer needs to use its short-tenn and long-term secret keys, k and x, to generate the signature s for the Diffie-Hellman public key Y. However, the verifier can use the signer's long-term public key y to verify the signature s for r. (See [9] for detailed discussions.) We point out that the MQV key agreement protocol in [7] actually used one of the variants in Table 1. v' = r.ns mod n In the following discussion we assume that A and B want to establish a secret key(s) using the key agreement protocol. Thc short-term secret key and short-term public kcy for A are kA and r,, and the long-term secret key and longterm public key for A are x,,, and yA. Similarly, B has kB, r,, x , and y,. The following key agreement protocol enables A and B to est&lish an authenticatcd secret key K. (i) A generatcs a random short-term secret key lcA and its corresponding public key r.4, and computes the signature s, based on any variant as listed in Table 1 Possible attaelcs: One drawback of the above protocol is that it does not offer perfect forward secrecy [12] , i.e. if an adversary learns one shared secret key they can deduce all shared secret keys between A and B. We illustrate this attack in the following discussion.
Assume that the protocol uses x = rk + s modp -1 to sign each Diffie-Hcllman public key. We then have the following two equations: z,+ = r .~k n + s~n i o d p --l a n d~~ = r~k~+ s~r r i o d p -l By multiplying these two equations, we obtain J A Z B = rakal.nkt,+raIcasB+sArBkB+sAsB In other words,
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where KAn = a x~Z e mod p is the long-term shared secret key. Assume that the adversary knows one short-term shared secret key K. The adversary can then solve the long-term shared secret key K,, from the above equation since the other parameters are all known. Thus, the adversary can solve all other shared secret keys based on the same equation.
Impvoved protocol: In the two-pass MQV key agreement protocol, instead of using K = ak-rk~ = r 3 = I.& modp as the shared secret sharcd secret key. The MQV protocol can provide perfect forward secrecy.
Here, we want to propose an efficient protocol that enables A and B to share multiple secret keys in one round of message key, it llSeS K = @ A~E + , @ A = y p r A *B = y j~y p m o d p as the exchange. For simplicity, we assume that A and B want to share four secrets.
(i) A generates two random short-term secret keys, kA, and kA,, and two corresponding public keys, r,, and rA2, rA, < rA2. Then, A computes the signature S A for {rAlr rAz} based on any signature variant as listed in Table 1 . For example, A ObtdinS s , by solving the following equation sends {r,,,, ?Az, SA, certfjA)} to B, where certb,,) is the publickey certificate of y A signed by a trusted pruty.
(ii) Similarly, B generates kBl, kB,, r,,, rB2, sB and sends {r,,, r,,, s , , certfj,)} to A. (iii) A verifies {r,,, I ,,} based on the signature sB and B s public key y B by checking Then A computes the shared secret keys as
(iv) Similarly, B computes CI'A,~A, modp first and verifies {rAl, rA2}. Then, B computes the shared secret keys as In other words, we have
If the adversary knows four consecutive shared secret keys, he can solve the long-term shared secret KAB. Thus, to achieve the perfect forward secrecy, we should l i t ourselves to use only three out of the four shared secret keys. The protocol can be generalised to enable A and B to share n2 ~ 1 secrets if each user computes and sends n Difie-Hellman public keys in each pass. Since each user only needs to generate (verify) one signature for n different DiffieHellman public keys to establish n2 ~ 1 shared secret keys, this new protocol is very efficient.
Conclusion:
We have proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol that utilises a digital signature to authenticate DiffieHellman public keys. We summarise features in this new protocol as follows: (i) Since we integrate the Diffie-Hellman public key in the signature scheme, this approach reduces overall computation.
(ii) Since the protocol does not use any one-way hash function, the security assumption relies solely on solving the discrete logarithm problem.
(iii) This protocol allows two communication parties to share multiple secret keys in two-pass interaction.
(iv) The computation for shared secret keys is simpler than the MQV protocol.
Introduction: In 1996, Fan and Lei proposed a blind signature scheme based on quadratic residues (QRs) [l] , and they also presented an enhanced version of the scheme to reduce the computation for requesters or users 
